10. November 2010

Pension funds' currency hedging

There has been considerable debate in the media recently about pension funds' currency hedging in the run-up to the banking collapse. They have been accused of engaging in speculation, or outright “gambling”, with fund members' money, which is simply incorrect. Currency hedging and currency management by pension funds are an important part of their operations and aim to protect the value of foreign assets against fluctuations in exchange rates. When the Icelandic króna strengthens, the value of pension funds' foreign assets, measured in krónur, diminishes, and such a reduction can impair fund members' pension rights. Currency management is intended to reduce the effects of exchange rate fluctuations as far as possible, for the benefit of fund members and their rights. Currency hedging is therefore part of pension funds' ordinary risk management and has nothing to do with speculation.

Currency management is considered a normal part of pension funds' investment strategy around the world. The fundamental principle here is to link the underlying assets to hedging contracts protecting those same assets. Foreign securities in well-diversified international equity portfolios have made up around a third of pension funds' assets. Buying equities carries risk, which shows up mainly in fluctuations in the securities' price. When the equities are foreign, currency risk is added, since obligations to fund members are in Icelandic krónur. That risk can be limited through currency hedging.

It is generally accepted that it is reasonable to reduce hedging when the króna's exchange rate is very high, but to increase hedging when the rate is low. When the exchange rate strengthens, the value of the relevant pension fund's foreign assets, calculated in Icelandic krónur, falls, and vice versa when the rate weakens. Active currency hedging softens the effects of exchange rate fluctuations, and over the longer term, pension funds' performance becomes more stable than it would otherwise be.

Actively managing exchange rate risk certainly involves both difficulty and responsibility. Doing nothing, and failing to protect the funds' foreign assets at any given time, involves no less difficulty and responsibility, since exchange rate fluctuations can have serious consequences for returns and fund members' rights.

Earlier in 2008, some pension funds' currency hedging increased as a proportion of their foreign securities holdings, as new contracts were made following a substantial weakening of the króna and also because of falling prices of foreign securities. Claims and speculation that pension funds increased their currency management in the run-up to the banking collapse in the hope of quick profits are therefore in no way justified.

The pension funds' foreign assets are mainly held in equity funds and, by their nature, are invested for the long term, since they are intended to meet long-term obligations. It was common for pension funds to enter into currency contracts of 6–12 months after currency management was introduced in Iceland in 2001. It has been criticised that pension funds entered into contracts of such short duration against long-term obligations. In view of this, it should be pointed out that although individual contracts were made for shorter periods, the currency hedging was intended for the longer term. Contracts were renewed as circumstances allowed and were thus managed with long-term goals in mind. Pension funds simply were not offered the option of entering into longer-term contracts.

Up until the banking collapse, the pension funds had been actively managing currency hedging with good results for a number of years. However, when the foreign exchange market broke down in the run-up to the banking collapse in March 2008, it had serious consequences for those seeking contracts for currency management. When the Icelandic banking system then collapsed within a few days in the autumn of 2008, the contracts were thrown into complete disarray, and the banks were unable to meet their obligations under them. The pension funds have argued that the contracts should be cancelled because the assumptions underlying them had failed. Negotiations have been sought with the banks' winding-up committees on how the matter can be resolved. It is important for the pension funds and Icelandic society that agreements on this be reached.

Árni Guðmundsson, CEO of Gildi Pension Fund
Guðmundur Þórhallsson, CEO of the Commercial Workers' Pension Fund
Haukur Hafsteinsson, CEO of the Pension Fund of State Employees

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